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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has appellate ~ uiis^r ]- -

this appea- ::.:..

- -

Lormal adjudicative

proceeding before the Utah State 'J ax Commission pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. ^,.:-_.-.

- Court has

juj isdietion over this appeal pursuant to Jtah Code Ann. §
78-2a-2 (2) •" x (2002) based on uiu iiaiibit-i ..|.l*r ..i i rj,:.
J ,; reii:*

• '-!.-•• -d November 5, 2003.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I.

Was tnc- I.-;

•*:

' ±11 finding Stevensc1.

responsible person pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ..--,302(100-.., .... . "

i to collect,

account for, and pay over withholdino tax?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When • '-^HPWI ii'| formal administrative proceedings
commenced before the commission, tnc LOU.
SupxeiiiL

Cuu i i

:

,»tr I

' .

(a) grant the commission deference concerning _ j
written findings of fact, applying a substant"-1
evidence standard on review; and grant the
commission no deference concerning its conclusions
of law, applying a correction of errox standard,
1

unless there is an explicit grant of discretion
contained in a statute at issue before the
appellate court.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a) and (b) (2000).
II.

Can Stevenson meet his burden of proof on appeal to
show reasonable cause or insufficient evidence to
reverse the Final Decision of the Tax Commission?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing formal administrative proceedings

commenced before the commission, the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court shall:
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its
written findings of fact, applying a substantial
evidence standard on review; and grant the
commission no deference concerning its conclusions
of law, applying a correction of error standard,
unless there is an explicit grant of discretion
contained in a statute at issue before the
appellate court.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(a) and (b) (2000).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 59-1-302(2000).
(1) The provisions of this section apply to the
following taxes in this title: . . .
(g) withholding tax under Chapter 10,
Part 4.
2

(2) Any person required to collect, t •hru!]y
account for, and pay over any tax listed
Subsection (1) who willfully fails to .-oilect the
tax, fails to truthfully account for and pay over
the tax, 01 attempts in any manner to evade or
defeat any tax or the payment of the tax, shall be
liable for a penalty equal to the total amount of
the tax evaded, not collected, not accounted for,
or not paid over. This penalty is in addition to
other penalties provided by 1 a w
(7) (b) It is prima facie evidence that a person
has willfully failed to collect, truthfully
account for, or pay over any of the taxes listed
in Subsection (1) if the commission or a court
finds that the person charged with the
responsibility of collecting, accounting for, or
paying over the taxes:
(J) made a voluntary, conscious/
and intentional decision to
prefer other creditors over the
state government or utilize the
tax money for personal purposes;
(i i) r e c k l e s s l y

disregarded

obvious or known risks, which
resulted in the failure to
collect, account for, or pay
over the tax; or
(iii) failed to investigate ;i
to correct mismanagement, having
notice that the tax was noi oris not being collected,
accounted for, or paid uvei i
provided ^-'~ 1 .:w .
- commission or court need not find

3

a bad motive or specific intent to
defraud the government or deprive it of
revenue to establish willfulness under
this section.
26 U.S.C. § 6672 FAILURE TO COLLECT AND PAY OVER TAX, OR
ATTEMPT TO EVADE OR DEFEAT TAX
(a) General Rule- Any person required to collect,
truthfully account for, and pay over any tax
imposed by this title who willfully fails to
collect such tax, or truthfully account for and
pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any
manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the
payment thereof, shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty
equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or
not collected, or not accounted for and paid over.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
This case is an appeal by Mr. Eric Stevenson of a Utah
State Tax Commission Final Decision dated August 18, 2003.
(R. 3-9.) attached as an Addendum to Appellant's Brief,
"Final Decision of the Tax Commission."

On May 13, 2002,

the Taxpayer Services Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission notified Stevenson of a preliminary assessment of
a personal non-payment penalty.

(R. 217.)

A Statutory

Notice of the assessment in the amount of $12,018.04 was
4

sent on .^Ua . .._ ,

' 1 °. '

On August 0, 2002,

^rpvenson filed a Petition for Redetermination., requtb
hearing on this matter
i lorn..:.

Oi l August t, 2003,

TO:--::— took place before the Commission regaic-..:
,nr

Stevenson's petition
- ~~

.

:. :

Conclusions c: Lav;,

io Final D e ^ s i o n

on August 18, 2 01M, which aftirme
persona: . • . .

"•^smpnt.

ission issued

. n:i •

(R. 3-9.

u o

':evenson filed an

appeal of this decision of September 1 ; ,
. STATEMENT OF FACTS
T

T'^—^ Communication^, Inc
organized

ltah corporation

: :: 1 oor^ was u.,^^-.-

22h)

•-'•ni'^

zOOJ.

(P.

i ui its dissolution, Tower had faileo *o

pay withholding tax for the second,
quaiLej v t

226.)

T

• :

•.

h e amount owed in withholding

tax from the filed returns was v l - / ,owe:

n

- led equally

- - —• 4 3 v

w •hree individuals:

Brett IN. Cherry, Ken Steckelberg, and Erio Stevens« >n (( I 11 • •
Appellant

/D

..•.

•!

237.)

Stevenson was the

'^cr^< - *-v 'Treasurer of the corporation.
5

/-n

Stevenson held another full-time job, and was not involved
in the day-to-day operations of Tower; however, Stevenson
had the sole authority to sign checks for Tower.
231, 238, 265.)

(R. 227,

Each month Stevenson would receive a stack

of checks to sign from the bookkeeper, and Stevenson would
sign the stack of checks without requesting supporting
documentation.

(R. 243, 244, 265.)

Stevenson had signed

the checks that paid the withholding taxes for 1999 and the
first quarter of 2000.

(R. 55, 56, 265, 266.)

Although

Stevenson did not review any financial records, Tower's
President, Ken Steckelberg, told Stevenson that Tower's
finances were being managed appropriately.
241-243.)

(R. 227, 228,

In late November 2000, after hearing from third

parties that Tower may not be meeting all of its financial
obligations, Stevenson made an unannounced visit to Tower's
place of business to review the financial records.
245-248.)

(R. 228,

During this investigation, Stevenson learned that

Tower was delinquent in its obligation of withholding tax in
the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2000.
248.)

(R. 228,

Upon learning of the true financial status of Tower,
6

Stevenson i m m e d i a t e l y closeo L;_ •> •. .
t.-.„ - vii"--:r«"_:,

'- r-prided tha"

winding up p r o c e s s .

T

-T.r,.?r* , fired

^ w e r d i s s o l v e , and began the

(R. 228, ^ 8 , 2<*J.,
' • ,T " •' ications, orf

receive pay..i*-n\

clients, Stevenson used personal funds
purchase C]UJLIUS :.

..t..

of Towei .

«v^ . - .'

'^'actors and suppliers

4}

'-ii were owed m o n e y oy Tower for work c o m p l e t e d .

2 5 3 - 258.)
• or
230.)

Upon +"he purcnci.

• .

j Lntii paid $83,211.4 1 •-w -J •

By way of an agreement G - L L

£:t;t:

. :-

. '

to the Bank of Utah

s

.:

-whicn iiau a securtiu

.

II1. '.if,

fowe^

n.'

, °P''l,

'F

r.

,,l l i', v

•

~h

?~0) i n s t e a d of the

state to satisfy the past due w i t h h u x u x n g
_

XO

nvrr.ent from XO t' be p a i o directly

Stevenson w a ^ <-J personal guarantor)

2 5 9 , ^K , ,

:\r,

•"*

,

Laxe^.

to Bank :*

ntah

($83,211.41) w o n ' i have satisfied in ful "' * n^ .
taxes due

($12,

~"

' -4

'^-'l'1,

"
'
" '' "

jvj

on Ma'

_,

2002, i he C o m m i s s i o n notified Stevenson c : a p r e l i m i n a r y
a s s e s s m e n t of a p e r s o n a l non-paymei i \. p e n a l t y .
.;JL.

(R. 43.)

• • • assessment in the a m o u n t of

A

$12,018.04 was sent on July 12, 2002.

(R. 43-47.)

On

August 9, 2002 Stevenson filed a Petition for
Redetermination, requesting a hearing on this matter.
215- 216.)

(R.

On August 5, 2003 there was a Formal Hearing

before the Utah State Tax Commission.

(R. 3-9.)

On August

18, 2003 the Utah State Tax Commission issued its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision in which
Petitioner was found to be a responsible party for paying
over the tax, and that Petitioner willfully failed to pay
over the withholding tax.

(R. 3-9.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302 (2) (20*00) states that the
individual responsible for collecting and turning over
withholding tax can be assessed a personal penalty equal to
the amount of the tax unpaid if the individual acted
willfully in failing to do so.

Stevenson was a responsible

person for paying over the tax and he willfully failed to do
so.

Stevenson has conceded that he is the responsible

person under § 59-1-302(2) (2000) (Petitioner's Brief pp. 3,
6) .

Once the individual is found to be the responsible
8

p e l bui i

M M 1 U.I I " I i > «1 | • i

* I shifts to the indivi dual to

prove he/she did net ^ct wiJlfuZly.

Section L»

sets tui:;,

evidence for Wo.iii^.1

..±e;u^.i

. ..

conduct, and Stevenson is willfully liable under one or

^

of these:
1- Stevenson made a voluntary, conscious, and
intentional decision to prefer othei uieuimis ever tree
state government or utilize the tax money for personal
purposes. After knowing of th^ f ax u^xjiq, ~--\>
Lc.i -j pt:.^u

*

' * • - :^

: .rchase claims from subcontractors

•

that were holding up a payment from XO Communications
Tower

Hnor

-,. -:.

directed the funds r

-r-merit i '/ XO, Stevenson

he paid directly to sank rf Utah,
*T:aent would

instead oi te : e^ .iu.
have satisfied the delinquency to the State

: :^:ln .

2- Stevenson recklessly disregarded y^wpus . . ..newn
risks, .-,:..• : resulted in the failure to collect, account
for, or pay over the tax.
. vr- •

'•-u.ri'

As tne L-~J-^L- _. ..to. . -

necking accounts, Stevenson haa a

duty tu be informed of the financial situation o: :. ;I<L
9

corporation.

By not taking reasonable measures to ensure

the taxes were being paid, Stevenson recklessly disregarded
an obvious risk which resulted in a failure to pay over the
tax.

Stevenson was given, and knew he was given, the only

signing authority for the corporation.

By never

investigating what he was signing, by not keeping up on the
financial status of the corporation, and by relying solely
on the word of Mr. Steckelberg, whom Stevenson knew had
declared bankruptcy (R. 285) in the past, Stevenson acted
recklessly.

This recklessness resulted in a failure to pay

the taxes.
3- Stevenson failed to investigate or to correct
mismanagement, having notice that the tax was not or is not
being collected, accounted for, or paid over as provided by
law.

Stevenson was on constructive notice that the taxes

were not being paid.

As the Secretary/Treasurer of the

corporation, Stevenson had an affirmative duty to
investigate and correct tax non-payment.

Stevenson had paid

the previous withholding taxes in 1999 and the first quarter
of 2000.

As the sole signatory for the company, Stevenson
10

'JMOUJ'J

li

WK-J

knov'ii ii

t I i he wasn't signing the checks

pay the taxes, that no cnt

was paying the taxes,

t^ investigate .

" -•• ."inement once he had

constructive notice that Tower was not paying the
withholding taxes, Sz^\^L:-

.

>' • <—

±

of

vainess.
Stevenson took no e i i . r

, i* ••

funds whi. .]*"' having a fiduciary duty ic

• ' *. - j tax
ic

.

the reasonable cause defense to appl \ , -i •
person

HILLS!

t

,LV^

In oiaer for

•.-{..,,

rpasonable efforts to protect the funds,

and then those efforts must be f r u s t r a t e , y o n , .•... Jice::..;
outside »• it

1J.IL,

< - »-

r

•

he took any effort to protect

''•*•*• on iias failed t<~> show that
t no funds, a~d albo n^s ; ^ _ - .

to show that any efi

n irustrated JJJ

circumstances outside of his control.
Stevenson/s reasonable n .

Therefore,

i* L •

.1.

Finally, Stevenson has failed to properly marshal the
"' - l ' •)

evidence used by the commiscicn a. :tu.i.> ..,
of I.lit- Utah Huh-s nf Appellate Procedures.

Thi s failure to

marshal the evidence h\ Itself may be i a t ^ i.

11

_. -_,

appeal.

In addition, this Court is required to give

deference to the Tax Commission's findings on factual issues
according to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610.
willfulness is a factual question.

The issue of

Because the Commission's

findings of fact were based on substantial evidence and were
not erroneous, this Court must sustain the Commission's
finding that Stevenson acted willfully under § 59-1302 (2) (2000) .

Therefore, the Commission's imposition of the

personal penalty was appropriate should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PERSONAL PENALTY ASSESSMENT AGAINST STEVENSON
IS PROPER BECAUSE HE IS A "RESPONSIBLE PERSON"
REQUIRED TO COLLECT, ACCOUNT FOR, AND PAY OVER
THE WITHHOLDING TAX AND BECAUSE HE WILLFULLY
FAILED TO DO SO.

Utah Code Ann. §59-1-302(2) states:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account
for, and pay over any tax listed in Subsection (1)
who willfully fails to collect the tax, fails to
truthfully account for and pay over the tax, or
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax
or the payment of the tax, shall be liable for a
penalty equal to the total amount of the tax
evaded, not collected, not accounted for, or not
paid over.
Because Utah cases are limited, we look to the Federal

12

•^oae iu:

. : " :•

• U.S.C.A. §6672 has essentially

the same languar:*. a: Utah Coae §59-1-302 (,
dealing with §t>. .- t •...-.. ^

. I_J cases

* hdt uiit person

assessed the personal penalty is n ''responsible person "
That means they are a perse;.

-•Jl-.

for and pay over the withholding tax.

• .- -Once i t ::.

established the person is a responsible ^< i son
of proof ^h|-i<.

account

t h^ hurden

• liie taxpayer then must show that they

did not act willtuliy in failing to colled, cic^.-uiil
':. i - e d States, 3 F. 3d 1 :r t\

pay ove
(10th C • r. 19 93) .

In an effort to move away from ..

1381

..

liability tor the iesponsib.1 t;:" pet soi i, the 10th Circuit does
recognize a reasonable cause defense.

This defense is

"limited to those circumstances wlu. i- I I I I he taxpayer has
made reasonable efforts to orotect the MI .st lunas, but (2)
those efforts have been fr-^^^i :•.»..
I Mr- taxpayer';-, control."

.-.-*--r^e. outside

Finley v. U.S. , 123 F.3d 1342,

1348 (10th Cir. 1997) .

13

A.

Stevenson, as One-third Owner and
Secretary/Treasurer, is a Responsible Person
Because He Had the Authority to Control Tower's
Finances, and Because He Was the Sole Authorized
Signatory On All Tower's Checks.

The 10th Circuit has held that an individual is a
"responsible person" under §6672 if the individual "has
significant, though not exclusive, authority in the general
management and fiscal decision making of the corporation."
Taylor v. Internal Revenue Service, 69 F.3d 411, 416 (10th
Cir. 1995) (quoting Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029,
1032 (10th Cir. 1993)).

The Taylor court then states a

"non-exclusive list of factors demonstrating an indicia of
responsibility... specifically, we examine whether the
person: (1) held corporate office; (2) controlled financial
affairs; (3) had authority to disburse corporate funds; (4)
owned stock; and (5) had the ability to hire and fire
employees."
the company.

.Id.

Stevenson was a one-third shareholder in

(R. 226, 228, 231, 237.)

Stevenson was the

Secretary/ Treasurer and was the only authorized person to
sign checks for the company.

(R. 227, 231, 238, 265.)

regularly signed checks each month.
14

(R. 243, 244, 265.)

He

mh

^ Tavlc i - O U I L declared tha-

.7 tn- taxpayer "possess [es]

sufficient indicia of respons^L^iii'.
person under §6t.7lJ r^qardlesb

L" "

:

• * .-: ^
whether ;.^:

x_,

:.as the

final say as to which creditors should be paid, ^r
v

the specific job

; ^rate structure to r ^

the taxes are paid over to iiic government."
Circuit continues, ' • .

.

Id.

.

The

that
l

-.'.-Cher the

person had the actual authority or abilit*

in view of his

status within the corporation, in jii( iii» i r-'^*- nwrn."
St-p-vpr,,- r r .; status as the sole signatory cf the checks and
as the Secretary/Treasurer demonstrate tJh_ _ :^: ,
aci : .

• .*

- - •

*

*

:• -

+

! •

+

state and that he possesses "sufficient u ^ U x a

of

Tit lui and r a v - - e - Mie

respoiu.. . . •
company's withholdinq taxes.
authority u:_ .

^es owed to the

because Stevensc:. ..^^ ;.,,e

.

taxes, Stevenson is a

"responsible person" under the statute.

Though undisputed

(Appellant's Brief at i

"Lit i

,

„ II

signi f i cant.

15

is

B.

Stevenson Willfully Failed To Collect, Account
For, or Pay Over The Withholding Tax When He
Intentionally and Voluntarily Preferred Other
Creditors Over the State and When He
Recklessly Disregarded an Obvious Risk that
Resulted in Nonpayment of the Tax.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302 (7) (b), Stevenson
willfully failed to collect, account for, and pay over the
tax because (a) he used personal funds to resolve claims
against Tower without first paying the delinquent tax, he
intentionally directed more than $80,000 collected from XO
be paid to Bank of Utah instead of the State after being
made aware of the tax delinquency, (R. 38-42, 230, 259, 260)
(b) he recklessly disregarded an obvious risk which resulted
in a failure to pay the tax when he ignored the absence of
payments for withholding tax, and (c) he failed to
investigate and correct the mismanagement when he neglected
to inquire about the lack of mandatory tax payments.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7)(b) states:
It is prima facie evidence that a person has
willfully failed to collect, truthfully account
for, or pay over any of the taxes ... if the
commission or a court finds that the person
charged with the responsibility of collecting,
accounting for, or paying over the taxes:
16

(I) made a voluntary, conscious, and
intentional decision to prefer other
creditors over the state government or
utilize the tax money for personal
purposes;
(ii) recklessly disregarded obvious •-.:
known risks, which resulted in the
failure to collect, account for, -r '
over the tax * --^
(iii) failed t:c investigate or to correct
mismanagement, having notice that the tax
was not or is not being collected,
accounted f o*r - ~ r paid over as provided
by law.
Only one prong c*
met.

.

• . .

be

'-vpn>rr meets all three; and the C-urt should uphold

the Tax Commission's finding of a^unuc^i
ev-_i*':.

* - -.i< *

i.ev^':

r

'• ^.-i^ ri,Tments to creditors instead of

payina Lhe delinquent witnholding tax
preseni ..n-_ir- *

:.!,.;. :,.;,:i..

. :j.:.«jb., ... s

^ • • person "acts or fails to act

consciously and voluntarily and with knowledge or i:.i^;_
that as a resuli

'' . ii. m ? j«.if.

:-tion trust funds

belonging Lw the government will net oe p~id over but w
be used for other purposes.'
Olsen K

I-IW •

quoting

United States, 952 F.2d 236, 240 (8t!1 Cir. 1-9V*
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Upon discovering an unpaid tax, it is the duty of a
responsible person "to apply unencumbered corporate funds to
pay the tax liabilities for the ... delinquent quarters as
well as any future quarters.'' Jd.

According to Sorenson v.

United States, unencumbered corporate funds will consist of
any personal funds either loaned to the corporation or used
for corporate purposes.

521 F. 2d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1975)

(stating "[t]he use to which the funds were put, Viz. the
payment of corporate obligations, transformed [the
taxpayer's] personal funds into funds of the corporation").
Failure by a responsible person to pay the tax while
continuing to pay other creditors will result in a personal
non-payment assessment against the responsible person.
Stauffer v. United States, 1998 WL 681478, at *1 (D. Colo.
Aug. 27, 1998), 82 A.F.T.R. 2d 98-6204.

Additionally, "the

willfulness requirement is met if there is evidence that the
responsible officer had knowledge of payments to other
creditors after he was aware of the failure to remit the
withheld taxes." Thibodeau v. US, 828 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th
Cir. 1987) quoting Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151,
IS

]

'

^

-

•

•''

When Stevenson intentionally and a^iii-.-iateiy p-j..;
other cred-i. •_'._:..: ;;:-m.:

' •'• -:;JOII lcarnino "-f >;he tax

delinquency he me' willfulness.

Stevenson has iijci^aieu

that he used nearly

-u

claims against Tower in order to facilitate m e
the company's accounts receivaL : u
fi^-t-r so,

:-y

secured creditor

. ;\5^:-

•

.•

mi

recovery of

. :*
£b . }

By doing

: ii- , -:;*•: •' ,

e luiiua -Liito corpora + e funds.

Sorenson, 521 F.2d at Z?J .
those new]

.at

Stevenson used personal m ^ ^

t,...,

:

'resolve

v

The statute dictates m - .
!

iub to

>

•„-=<

I

creaitc rs ahead

of the State constitutes prima, facie evidence, that Stevensoi 1
wiJltully tailed "

. <.d.U'Cl, a^ondi 1

' ', and r v

over the

taxes.
A taxpayer viulates Lhe i.Ldtu1,

"

hoos'nq t? pit/

credi tors other than [the .state] with knowledge of m e
delinquency."

Hammon v. L.^ .

S'tevt-jiu iun becamp a w ^ e oi m e
2000

(R. 248.)

tax

Lax delinquency

After being made aware -^
19

.._

November of
^-..

:--

. y,

Stevenson then made an agreement with XO to pay a claim owed
by Tower directly to Bank of Utah (R. R.39-42, 259- 62.)
This is similar to the facts in a 1995 10th Circuit case,
Bradshaw v. United States, 83 F.3d 1175, 1183 quoting Kalb
v. United States, 505 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 1974)

in which

the personal penalty was upheld against an officer in a
closely held corporation, because the officer "not only knew
of but negotiated the arrangement with the bank under which
other creditors were preferred to the government...while
knowing that withholding taxes were not being paid."

Just

like in Bradshaw, Stevenson knew that his company had not
paid the withholding taxes when he made the arrangement to
direct the XO funds directly to Bank of Utah. (R. 247, 251,
253, 259-264.)

By making the arrangement to have XO pay

funds owed to Tower directly to Bank of Utah instead of to
the State to satisfy the delinquent tax, after being made
aware of the tax delinquency, Stevenson intentionally
preferred a creditor over the State.

Under Hammon and

Bradshaw, this preference is a willful violation of the
Statute.

Choosing to pay another creditor ahead of the
20

state is also pr:i i na faci e evi d e n c e o f \ ;i ] ] fi i] ] y f a i l i n g to
c o l l e c t , account

b-;? t"ind p a w r ver t h e taxer u n d e r t h e

S t a t u t e . U t a h C o d e /in;..
A d d i t i o n a l l y , this C o u r t should upholc the T a x
C o m m i s s i o n ' s f i n d i n g of s u i i i . c : c M pi.::.j

•

z

> :.* •

.diled Lu c o l l e c t , a c m u r " for., ar. u

Stevens-'i, i will*

o v e r t h e w i t h h o l d i n g tax w h e n h e r e c k l e s s !

v^\

aisregaiat J

• • • r:"" w - r m a y b e d e l i n q u e n t ^.

O;JV..O!..,.

tax o b l i g a t i o n s to the S t a t e , a n d that he f a i l e d to
i n v e s t i g a t e w I i e 11 1 e i S t ecke 1 b e r g wa s a de q i i a t e ] y ma naming the
company's financial affairs.

In Hammon, the court he^d that

a "showing of reci.ici: J . J I L J J .

• ..

' • •"

~e 01

tr.rpe elements: (x; LO-- responsible person's knowledge (or
reason to know) of a i.isk tnut: taxes \ i I I
reasons
and

* onpcriuiiity io d i s c o v e r and remedy t h e p r o b l e m ,

(3) a f a i l u r e to u n d e r t a k e t h e reasorir.^o c- i ;

€:.. ui>-

Po

29-30 (CI. Ct.

riammc-

_

:

U n i t e d S t a t e s , 21 C I . C t .

f

lr-rr
~of ±n showing

Stevenson :;-.:..

that he did not disregard a known or rovi* us risk that the
21

taxes would not be paid or that he did not fail to
investigate Tower's financial condition.

Stevenson's

actions satisfy the first element of reckless disregard as
stated in Hammon when Stevenson was (or should have been)
aware of an obvious risk that Steckelberg was not remitting
the trust funds to the State. Stevenson has acknowledged
that he possessed sole authority to sign checks drawn on
Tower's business account, and as such, he actually signed
and processed checks "as directed by Mr. Steckleberg."
Appellant's Brief at 2-3.

Therefore, whether Stevenson

received documentation regarding the checks he processed or
not, he was able to observe the different payments made to
Tower's creditors and the complete lack of any payments made
to the State for withholding tax for the last three quarters
of 2000.

This should have indicated to Stevenson that there

was an obvious risk that the trust funds were not protected.
This contradicts Stevenson's indication that he was not
responsible for, and did not have access to, "accounts or
obligations for which payments were made."'
Additionally, Stevenson satisfies the second Hammon
22

element .,.;,._ :..

'

•-

'he

opportunity to discover and remedy the delinquency.
partial owner and Secretary-Trici^uiLi, _, L-

As a

:i..- :

rpa.sonnble ^roortunity to discover that Tower was delinquent
. .- - ts payments :f the withholding tax by merely reviewing
••• -

r

-.-•-

^s the sole authorized

signatory, he also had the authority to remedy the
i^-i.-^'. :- - t , .

-*r . . r

•

ne State.

for several months, Stevenson neglected t

However,

undertake any

extorts to ensure payt.t.
Steckelberg about the company's overall finances anci
operations.
Lastly, Stevenson satisfies the third element of Hammon
when Stevenson did not make any reasonable efforts Lu ensure
payment

- r-rsonal knowledge Stevenson had about

the absence of payments to the State,
Steven:"* »n I

Iis ,,v v jv ' 1 ' '• •' " r,^v:ledcfe and instead rely on

Steckelberg's misrepresentations.
disregard of ai :i
oa:^,

unreasonable for

--

.herefore, Stevenson's
. r «r/" i i< : t have been

coupled wit;* ;*is failure Lo further investigate, is
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prima facie evidence that he willfully failed to collect,
account for, and pay over the tax.

Case law clarifies the

affirmative duty of Stevenson: "[Appellant] cannot escape
liability by claiming that he relied on the assurances of
others." Denbo at 1033,1034. Referencing Denbo at 988 F.2d
1034 quoting Hornsby v. Internal Revenue Service/ 588 F.2d
952, 953 (5th Cir. 1979) ("A fiduciary cannot absolve
himself merely by disregarding his duty and leaving to
someone else to discharge.") and Denbo at 1034 quoting
Hartman, 538 F.2d at 1344-45 ("Taxpayer's failure to see to
it that withholding taxes were paid was willful despite that
his office as president was merely titular.")
"The primary focus of the willfulness test is the
taxpayer's diligence in attending to the duty to pay
employment taxes.

By undertaking all reasonable efforts to

fulfill that duty, taxpayers can show that they did not
willfully neglect their obligations under §6672."

Hammon v.

U.S. 21 Cl.Ct. 14 at 27 (quoting Feist v. United States, 221
Cl.Ct. 531, 542, 607 F.2d 954, 961 (1979)).
"The willfulness requirement is also met if the
24

responsible otiicui :-.11 :
or obvious risk

",l r^ck less disregard of a known

rV

~<i *rust funds may be remitted to the

government ' " Thiioodeau, . . .

'ewsome) .

THE REASONABLE CAUSE DEFENSE SHOULD FAIL BECAUSE
STEVENSON HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT HE TOOK
REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE TRUST FUNDS AND
THAT THOSE EFFORTS WERE THEN FRUSTRATED BY
CIRCUMSTANCES OUTSIDE OF HIS CONTROL.
Because Stevenson failed to demonstrate reasonable
cause as to why he was unable t
Srf-;^r.° •

t

.

-r

correctly assessed and the 1 inal Decision was

correct : n affirming a personal non-pcc.i:^
Cod^

/\i ni ii!

r

c q

i

1 11 • '1 rid ( fi) c l a r i f i e s

....

the t r u s t fund nature of

withholding tax:
Each employer who deducts and withholds any amount
under this part shall hold the amount in trust for
the State of Utah for the payment of it to the
• Commission in the manner and at the ti me provi ded
for i n t h i s p a r t.
The Tenth Circui- has recognized a reasonable cause defense
to the assessment or ^ p^i-

.• .

r

>~z- '^

"

.---*•

Lul_

responsible persons who were unable to ensure payment of the
withholding tax.
in^tdii' e^ whe *

Specifica1 1w

the c^it.. -

" ^lyraver has made reasonable
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efforts to protect the trust funds, but (2) those efforts
have been frustrated by circumstances outside the taxpayer's
control."

Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342, 1348

(10th Cir. 1997).

In Finley, the court ruled that the

taxpayer may have had a reasonable cause defense to his
failure to pay withholding tax when he instructed his bank
to apply funds to the tax balance, but the bank refused,
instead applying funds to a loan it held.

Id.

The court

reasoned that by allowing the taxpayer to assert the
reasonable cause defense, the court was able to "preserve[]
a role for the jury to determine whether, based on all
relevant evidence in a particular case, the responsible
taxpayer's conduct reflects the requisite scienter."

Id.

This Court should affirm the Final Decision against
Stevenson because he has failed to show that he satisfies
the requirements of the reasonable cause defense.

First,

Stevenson has not demonstrated that he made any reasonable
efforts to protect the trust funds.

To the contrary,

Stevenson ignored all warning signs which indicated that the
trust funds were in jeopardy, such as the complete lack of
26

withholding tax payments to the State, and he unreasonably
relied on Steckeioerg' - leprebe;:.^; • ...
I

.+. ^v<..^rrn ^^

-

make reasonable efforts to protect the

trust tunas, he fails to satisiy the secon
reasons : ~

' ; • * '•'•••:

•..-.:..

oi-. >

< f^-; sf: when he possessed the authority to

discover and remedy the delinquency.
hi.. ciLL-n;L •

-.<.••

, - v i inauer -y was hampered by

Steckelbera's i; ..^representations.
owner ana oeciLL.;^

Stevenson cia^:.: •..;.-••_

.1*1:.

howevei , as one-tnira

•..-..-^ . 1 i the authority

and obligation L ~ confirm *^ : disprove Stec xelberq' s
representations.

Stevenson'^ L ,-. : •

=

ts: •

:

-r • * >

r^*. : •".-" r :ie financial records in December of 2000,
illustrates that if he wou±u have taxen L
ea.-Zi-c
successfu.

.1 ..

Lnose actions would tave been equally
Therefore, Stevenson has lai.ea to ;_

1 ) i s rec: k] ess di srega 1:d c f an obvious risk that the tax w c, u _ d
not be oaid qualifies tor a reasonable cause defense.
huo,

O...V-.-

. _ uiie reasonable

cause defense f^r w* '•fullv failina to ensure the collection
and payment o^

^

,.iiu^x_.,
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creditors ahead of the State.

No third party intervened in

blocking Stevenson's ability to remit those funds to the
State of Utah.

Therefore, Stevenson's decision to use those

personal funds to purchase the claims of creditors other
than Bank of Utah, rather than to pay the withholding tax,
is not excused by the reasonable cause defense.
Stevenson's inaction in protecting the trust funds does
not meet the necessary standard of reasonableness when his
only effort regarding the trust funds was to occasionally
ask Steckelberg how the company was doing.

While it is true

that Stevenson was not involved in the day-to-day operations
of Tower, he was the sole authorized signatory on the
company's checking account and an officer.

As such, he owed

a duty to oversee the financials of the company.
did not meet this duty.

Stevenson

Stevenson admits that he never paid

any attention to what he was signing, and did not request to
see the books of the company until after he had heard rumors
that Tower was not meeting its' financial obligations.
These actions are not adequate to ensure that trust funds
are turned over to the government.
28

III.

THE COURT MUST GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE TAX
COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUDING THAT
STEVENSON WILLFULLY FAILED TO PAY OVER THE
WITHHOLDING TAX SUCH THAT THE PERSONAL PENALTY
WAS PROPERLY ASSESSED UNDER THE STATUTE.
**

The Tax Commission' s Findings of Fact were
Based on Substantial Evidence and the Failure
of the Petitioner to Marshal Evidence to the
Contrary Requires this Court to Sustain the
Tax Commission's Final Decision.

This Court: :.:-^^

^-j-_r •

v

iax Commission

* ' Jb finding +h^t- Stevenson acted williuily i n failing to
pay over the wiLniiuj.uxiiM' tax-

°

rQ

1-610.)

Under the "substantial evidence" test, the Utah Code
Ann. § 59-1-610 (2000), states the reviewing ...nil -. 11.. I I
v

" . .i.

.-

:

"iference concerninn its written

findinns of fact, applying a substantial c-laence ^ a. J ^ I J . "
xx

^uDSLj./.idJ i" mlencc ' i

t 11 ii quantum and quality of

relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reusuu.,'!
!

mind to support a

. .

^st: National Bank of Boston

v. County Bd. Of Equalization of Salt Lake Countx,
1163 (Utah 1992).
\srintill.i

k

^star/.i^.

> :^

,.^d

-• than a mere

t: evidence... Lhough 'something less than the
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weight of the evidence.'" (Citations omitted.)

Grace

Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989).
The "substantial evidence" test requires review of the
whole record, including evidence that both supports the
agency's factual findings and evidence that fairly detracts
from the weight of the evidence.

Id.

at 68.

This does not

mean that this Court need grant equal weight to all the
evidence.

Ouestar Pipeline Company v. Utah State Tax

Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1993).

In the past, the Utah

Supreme Court noted that the "substantial evidence" test
"requires us to uphold an agency's factual findings if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence."

Zissi v.

State Tax Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992).
Rule 24(a) (9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
(Supp. 1999) states, "A party challenging a fact finding
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding."

Stevenson has failed to marshal the

fact evidence challenging his position.

The burden of proof

lies with the party appealing the administrative order.
at 852.

The challenging party must "marshal all of the
30

Id.

s ^ \. .

evidence

v unau despite the

supporting facts anc.

. ; qr *

the conflicting

contradictory ev,aence, t.
. r-tantial evidence.''

. .

Grace Drilling;

* - u*--

." * P. 2d at: bb .

"This Court has held that:
Successful challenges to findings <. f : , *r. thus
must demonstrate to appellate courts first how the
trial court found the facts from the evidence and
second why such findings contradict the weight of
the evidence.
Oneida/SLC v. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 8 72
.,

),

-scribing Lhe

responsibility cf the challenger this Court noted:
In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must
present in comprehensive and fastidious order,
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be
sufficient to convince the appellate court that
the court's finding resting upon the evidence is
clearly erroneous. (Emphasis added.)
West Valley City v. Majestic Investment ^ . ,
1 "< ! "

i

||

'001).

The Petitioner has failed to marshal

the evidence in accordance with these decisions.
B.

Because the Issue of Willfulness is a Question of
Fact, This Court Must Give Deference to the
Commission's Finding that Stevenson Acted
Willfully in Not Paying Over the Withholding Tax.

The U.S. 10th Circuit Court has recognized that the
issue of willfulness is a question of fact.

(See Bradshaw

v. U.S., 83 F. 3d 1175, 1183;

Taylor, 69 F. 3d at 417-18;

and Denbo, 988 F.2d at 1033) .

Therefore, this Court must

give deference to the Tax Commission in it's finding that
Stevenson acted willfully in failing to pay over the
withholding tax.

The Findings of Fact by the Tax Commission

in it's Final Decision, even if not sufficiently marshaled
by the Petitioner in it's brief, easily meets the
substantial evidence standard.

(See Addendum A.)

Thus, the

Tax Commission correctly concluded, "As an officer of the
company and the sole signer on Tower's checks, Petitioner
had a duty to investigate the situation as it developed and
attempt to correct the problem.

Rather than fulfill this

duty, Petitioner recklessly chose to remain unaware of the
problem.

Such reckless disregard of an obvious risk that
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withholding taxes were noi bh*iiM prinl iK'moiu,tidt ^d
^^'••iontii's willful failure to pay over Tower's withholding
taxes."

'~

'*-

n

)
CONCLUSION

•onclusion, Stevenson, as a responsxLue person
r-rivmen4" oenalty because he

proper^ _. _.L-^y^-u

w_i - ; fur: j - f ai ] ed to collect, account tor , ~r pay over the
withnoxvj^ixJ L J X '..:..:. ..•_ \ :.^:-...ii--::

"'

;"J"ors ovei the

State, he recklessly disregarded an obvious risk that the
tax would not be paid, and I ie fai 1 e :i t : i i : estigate
''^'^.aoement.

: J:

Stevenson's defense of reasonable

cause should fa: 1 because he oiu n^L ciiie;:^. .
.cd::n;j ;o ...•-*--.-

•

:

-r-tect the trust fund- and, assuming

arguendo that he made such efforts, those u t i c n s w^:_
r.":^ + :: -

^^^jLi-i-t-

'^"ond his conirol.

A d d i t i o n a l l v , because willfulness is a question oi :a.:,
tin J u . i i :uu_.

,-Mrer.c«

that Stevenson acted willfully.

ommissions finding
Stevenson also failed to

properly marshal :he evidence .
'".'.onimis" ; ""•r-

*J ~

T

T S were not substantially supported by the

evidence.
The Final Decision of the Tax Commission should be
sustained in its entlx^y.
DATED thiis

7-

day of October, 2004

GALE K / FRANCIS
/
Assistant Attorney General
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